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A recent argument, attributed to Masanes, is claimed to show that the assumption
that quantum measurements have definite, objective outcomes, is incompatible with
quantum predictions. In this work, a detailed examination of the argument shows that
it has a much narrower field of application than previously recognized. In particular, it
is found: i) that the argument only applies to hidden-variable models with a particular
feature; and ii) that such a feature is not present in most hidden-variable models,
including pilot-wave theory. It is concluded that the argument does not succeed in
calling into question the objectivity of quantum measurements.
1 Introduction
A number of recent arguments in the field of quantum foundations seek to call into ques-
tion the objectivity of quantum measurement results. In particular, they try to chal-
lenge the assumption that quantum measurements yield definite, objective outcomes.
These new arguments, often involving so-called extended Wigner’s friend scenarios, are
touted as having the added advantage of being formulated in terms of actual results
of measurements—and not in terms of potentially unreliable theoretical elements, such
as Bell’s λ’s or PBR’s ontic states.
One such argument is reported in a talk by Matthew Pusey [14], where it is at-
tributed to Lluis Masanes (see also [8, 1, 9]). The argument is described as easier to
understand, but containing all the essential features of the more popular no-go result
in [6].1 The proposed construction involves a gedankenexperiment with four observers,
in a sort of crossbreed between Wigner’s friend and Bell-type scenarios. The proposal
surely demands extreme technical capabilities, but is argued to be compatible, at least
in principle, with quantum theory.
This work offers a detailed examination of the argument. To do so, section 2 intro-
duces the argument, section 3 presents the analysis and section 4 states the conclusions.
1The result in [6] has been convincingly argued to crucially depend on an implicit assumption, to
the effect that when a measurement is carried out inside of a closed lab, such a measurement leads to
a collapse for inside observers, but does not do so for outside observers (see [2, 15, 16, 10, 4, 17, 12]).










Figure 1: Schematic representation of the gedankenexperiment.
2 The argument
The gedankenexperiment employed by the argument starts with the two spin-12 particles
of a singlet state being sent to two spatially separated laboratories, where observers
A1 and B1 perform spin measurements along directions a1 and b1, respectively; we
denote these measurement results, which take values +1 or −1, by A1 and B1. Next,
observers A2 and B2, who are outside of the laboratories of A1 and B1, respectively,
come and undo these initial measurements. The idea behind this is that, from the point
of view of, say, A2, all that happens when A1 measures, is some complicated unitary
transformation. Therefore, A2 can, at least in principle, come and apply the inverse
of such a unitary to A1’s laboratory to nullify the measurement. The last step is for
A2 and B2 to perform spin measurements on the original particles of the singlet, along
directions a2 and b2, respectively; we denote the corresponding results by A2 and B2 (a
schematic representation of the proposed gedankenexperiment is presented in Figure
1).
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To develop the argument, we start by assuming that all the observers involved
obtain objective results when they measure. That is, we assume that all the measure-
ments performed yield definite, objective outcomes. As a result of such an assumption,
there must exist a joint probability distribution for all four results, p(A1, B1, A2, B2).
Given such a joint probability distribution, one can calculate the marginal probabilities
p12(A1, B1), p23(B1, A2), p34(A2, B2), p14(A1, B2) and, with them, the expectation val-
ues of products of pairs of results E12(a1, b1), E23(b1, a2), E34(a2, b2), E14(a1, b2).2 Now,
as shown by Fine [5], the expectation values computed by these marginals necessarily
satisfy the CHSH inequality
|E12(a1, b1) + E23(b1, a2) + E34(a2, b2)− E14(a1, b2)| ≤ 2. (1)
That is, to assume a joint distribution for all four outcomes, leads to the same con-
sequences than imposing Bell’s locality. Of course, an important difference is that, in
this case, all four measurements are actually performed in each run of the experiment.
Next, we employ quantum mechanics to make predictions for the expectation values
in Eq. (1). We start with Eq12(a1, b1), for which we notice that the situation exactly
corresponds to a standard Bell scenario. In consequence,
Eq12(a1, b1) = − cos(a1 − b1). (2)
Similarly, Eq34(a2, b2) seems easy to compute. The state starts being a singlet, then
comes a big identity in its evolution, followed by standard Bell-type measurements. As
a result,
Eq34(a2, b2) = − cos(a2 − b2). (3)
The “mixed” terms, with one measurement by A1 (B1) and the other by B2 (A2)
seem more challenging. However, one might reason as follows. A1 (B1) measures its
particle. Then, to predict the result of B2 (A2), she updates the state according to the
result obtained, and evolves the state on the other side. However, that evolution simply
amounts to the identity, corresponding to the doing and undoing of the measurement.
As a consequence, for these mixed terms, we obtain the same predictions as in the
2As should be clear from the context, subscripts in p and E indicate which entries of
p(A1, B1, A2, B2) are being conserved while calculating the marginals.
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original Bell scenario, namely
Eq14(a1, b2) = − cos(a1 − b2), Eq23(b1, a2) = − cos(b1 − a2). (4)
The problem, of course, is that we know that these quantum predictions can violate
the CHSH inequality. That is, for adequate values of a1, b1, a2, b2,
|Eq12(a1, b1) + Eq23(b1, a2) + Eq34(a2, b2)− Eq14(a1, b2)| > 2. (5)
We arrive, then, at a contradiction. In detail, the assumption that all measurements
performed in the experiment yield definite, objective outcomes, which is what allowed
for Eq. (1) to be established, is found to be incompatible with the predictions of
quantum mechanics in Eq. (5).
From all this, it is concluded that quantum measurement outcomes cannot be taken
to be objective, at least not in a straightforward way. That is, the argument is taken
to entail that not every quantum measurement can be thought of as having a definite,
objective, physical outcome. Moreover, the argument is read as implying that, at least
in some sense, whatever maneuver is employed to deal with Bell’s theorem, such a
maneuver cannot be restricted to the microscopic level. That is, that the measure
taken to address the CHSH violation in the Bell case, must also have an effect on
actual, macroscopic experimental results.
3 Analysis
What are we to make of this argument? Does it really show that the objectivity of
measurement results must be called into question, i.e., that we have to throw away
the sensible idea that well-conducted measurements have definite, physical outcomes?
To begin with, we point out the obvious fact that, for the argument to run, one has
to assume that, during measurements, the evolution of the quantum state is purely
unitary. Otherwise, the whole idea of undoing the measurements clearly does not go
through. That is, it was only because we assumed that the measurements performed
by the first observers could be fully described by a complicated unitary, that we were
able to argue that such measurements could be undone by the application of another
unitary—namely, the inverse of the one describing the measurements. In contrast,
if one assumes that measurements involve some sort of breakdown of unitarity, the
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argument simply does not work. From this, it clearly follows that theories that take
this latter position, such as objective collapse models [7, 13], are simply not affected
at all by the argument.
We just saw that the argument requires the assumption that the evolution of the
quantum state is always unitary. Does that mean that we can at least conclude that
purely unitary quantum theory is inconsistent with the assumption that measurements
have definite outcomes? Not really. The argument presupposes 1) that measurements
always yield definite results, and 2) that the evolution of the quantum state is always
unitary. Now, in [11] it is shown that those two assumptions are incompatible with
another assumption, namely 3) that the physical description given by the quantum
state is complete. In other words, the assumptions of the argument imply that the
quantum description is incomplete, so it must be supplemented by so-called hidden
variables.
One might complain that the incompatibility result in [11] depends upon assuming
some level of objectivity or realism that goes against the spirit of the new type of
arguments under discussion. That is, that the whole point of these new arguments
precisely is to stay clear of theoretical constructs, such as hidden variables. However,
if the objective of these new results is to argue against an objective position, it would
amount to begging the question to assume from the onset that such a position should
not be taken.
We conclude, then, that with its assumptions, the argument presupposes the ex-
istence of hidden variables. The next question is whether this recognition makes any
difference in the derivation of the inconsistency. We recall that a key element of this
derivation was the calculation of the mixed correlations between a result from the first
set of measurements and one from the second. In the reconstruction of the argument
given above, we took those mixed expectation values to be given by Eq. (4), i.e., to be
equal to minus the cosine of the difference of the angles of the measurements involved.
Moreover, such a result was essential for the conclusion that the corresponding CHSH
inequality could be violated. However, in light of the fact that the argument requires
the existence of hidden variables, it is not clear that such a behavior for the mixed
correlations really obtains.
To see this, we note that the mixed expectation values being given by Eq. (4),
implies that if, say, a1 and b2 are equal, then the results of A1 and B2 would be
perfectly anticorrelated. That, of course, implies that if a1 and a2 are equal, then
the measurements of A1 and A2 would be perfectly correlated. However, since the
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result of a measurement is determined by the behavior of the hidden variables, for this
perfect correlation to obtain, it is necessary for the inverse unitary to also reverse the
evolution of the hidden variables in such a way that they have exactly the same values
before both pairs of measurements (or, at least, new values that guarantee the required
perfect correlation). That is, it is necessary for the undoing of the measurements to also
reverse the evolution of the hidden variables, such that their values at t2 are related
to those at t1 (see Figure 1) so to ensure the correlations needed. Otherwise, there
is simply no reason to expect a perfect correlation between the first and second sets
of measurements when the angles of the measurements are repeated. This, of course,
implies that, in general, there is simply no reason for the mixed correlations to be as
strong as needed for CHSH to be violated—from which it follows that the argument is
only relevant against hidden-variable models with this particular feature regarding the
behavior of the hidden variables during the inverse unitary.
Above it was mentioned that the argument has been read as implying that the
procedure employed to address the CHSH violation in the Bell case must have an
effect at the macroscopic level. However, now it is clear that this is not necessarily the
case. In particular, we see that a model may very well violate the CHSH inequality in
the standard Bell scenario, not do so in this case, and remain empirically viable. There
is, of course, ample evidence for the violation of CHSH for the Bell case. Needless
to say, the same cannot be said for the gedankenexperiment under discussion. In any
case, the point is that the violation of CHSH in one case is perfectly compatible with
its fulfillment in the other. Does this mean that models for which CHSH is not violated
in this case, make predictions which are incompatible with those of standard quantum
mechanics? Not really. What happens is that the inherently vague nature of the
collapse postulate in the standard framework—the ambiguity as to what causes it and
what it entails—allows for a range a predictions. Models that remedy this vagueness,
on the other hand, yield a precise prediction in that range.
We just saw that, in order for the argument to run, the hidden-variable models
considered must posses a particular feature. The important question, then, is which
hidden-variable models have it. For starters, it seems clear that hidden-variable models
with indeterministic elements in the evolution of the hidden variables, will not possess
the required feature. Therefore, they are not affected by the argument. What about
deterministic models? In that instance, it seems hard to say something generic, so
the analysis must proceed in a case by case basis. There is, of course, a particularly
significant deterministic hidden-variable model, the de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave theory
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(dBB) [3]. We turn next to the evaluation of that important case.
dBB is the best-developed example of a hidden-variable model. The framework pro-
poses that a complete characterization of anN -particle system is given by its wave func-
tion ψ(x, t) together with the actual positions of the particles {X1(t), X2(t), . . . , XN(t)},
which are taken to always possess well-defined values. The wave function is postulated
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In dBB, the observed outcome of, say, the measurement of the spin of a particle
along a given direction, is directly associated with the actual trajectory of the particle
measured. Therefore, two particles with exactly the same wave function, but different
initial positions, could lead to different results regarding a measurement of spin along
a given direction. Going back to the gedankenexperiment of the argument, what we
said above about dBB implies that, unless the positions of the particles are exactly the
same at t1 and t2, there is no reason for the correlations needed for the argument to
actually obtain.
Does dBB posses this required feature? That is, does the dBB dynamics imply
that, during the inverse unitary evolution that reverses the first set of measurements,
the particles go back to the positions they had before those measurements took place?
Well, as is well-known, dBB is indeed time-reversal invariant, which might suggest for
it to have the feature needed for the argument to run. In particular, the involution of
complex conjugation, which renders the Schrödinger equation time-reversal invariant,
also reverses the sign of the velocities of the particles. That is, if one sends t to −t and
takes the complex conjugate of the wave function, then the velocities of the particles
change sign.
However, this does not imply that dBB has the required feature. This is because,
what the inverse unitary does, is to send t to −t, but it does not involve a complex
conjugation. As a result, during the inverse unitary, the velocities of the particles do
not change sign, so particles do not go back to their original positions. This is easy
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to see by the fact that the velocities of the particles at a time, given by Eq. (7), are
a function of the instantaneous wave function at that time (e.g., there are no time-
derivatives on the right hand side of Eq. (7)). Therefore, if all the inverse unitary does
is to reverse the time order, then there is no reason for the velocities to change sign.
What about the possibility of the particles not returning to their original positions,
but having new values that guarantee the required correlations? It seems clear that
there is absolutely no basis to predict that this would happen. At any rate, the burden
of proof falls on whoever wants to argue to the contrary. All this means that dBB does
not possess the required property, so it is fully immune to the argument.
4 Conclusions
Recent arguments aim at calling into question the objectivity of quantum measure-
ment results. In particular, an argument attributed to Masanes, purportedly shows
that the assumption that quantum measurements yield definite, objective outcomes,
is incompatible with quantum predictions. However, by examining the argument in
detail, it is found that it, in fact, has a much narrower field of application than pre-
viously recognized. On one hand, the argument only applies to models with a purely
unitary evolution of the quantum state. Therefore, frameworks without this feature,
such as objective collapse models, are unaffected by the argument. On the other hand,
the presuppositions of the argument imply that the quantum state is incomplete, so
the argument requires the introduction of hidden variables.
Regarding hidden-variable models, the analysis has shown that the argument does
not apply to all of them—only to those with the very particular feature that the inverse
unitary also reverses the evolution of the hidden variables, such that they end-up with
exactly the same values before both pairs of measurements. Moreover, it is found that
such a feature is not present in generic hidden-variable models and, in particular, that
it is absent in the de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave theory—the most important hidden-
variable model. From all this, it is concluded that the argument explored does not
succeed in calling into question the objectivity of quantum measurements.
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